specifically charged by any other public official, body, or agency to advise or to make reports, investigations or recommendations. Public body shall not include the General Assembly of the State, nor any caucus thereof, or committee, subcommittee, ad hoc committee, special committee or temporary committee.
The amendment in 1985 to §10002(a) by the General Assembly changed the definition of "public body" to expressly include all standing committees established, appointed or empowered by public bodies. Applying plain rules of statutory construction to the provisions of 29 Del. C. §10002, this office has already ruled in Attorney General Opinion No. 94- IO11 (March 7, 1994) that it believes the Delaware courts are outside the scope of the Act because, inter alia, the courts are established by the Constitution and not by the General Assembly (Op. at 2). Attorney General Opinion No. 94-IO11 held that court records such as the data base of the administrative office of the Court are not subject to the Act even though the administrative office of the Court was created by the General Assembly. As pointed out in In Re: Reardon, Del. Supr., 378 A.2d 614, 615 n.1 (1977) the Board was established by the Delaware Supreme Court as "an arm" under its [exclusive] "inherent power to regulate the practice of law." Id.
To go one step further, established case law in Delaware is that it is a "[f]undamental constitutional privilege that this Court, alone, has sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters affecting governance of the bar." In Re: Infotechnology, Del. Supr., 582 A.2d 215, 220 (1990) (Board opening memorandum at 5). This power derives from the doctrine of separation of powers. See e.g., In Re: Nenno, Del. Supr., 472 A.2d 815, 819 (1983).
Even if this office were to apply a statutory construction analysis, outside established case authority, this office believes the Board falls outside the definition of "public body" in 29 Del. C. §10002(a). First, based upon existing case law enumerating above, the board is "an arm" of the Supreme Court. Second, conspicuously absent from the definition of "public body" contained in §10002(a) are the words "court" or "judicial branch". Although the General Assembly apparently failed to expressly exclude the courts and/or judicial branch in its definition in §10002(a) (like the General Assembly), we do not believe the Act applies for several reasons. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that in construing a statute the objective is to render a "sensible and practical meaning, not an absurd or unreasonable result." Rodney Square Inv'rs v. Bd. of Asses, etc., Del. Supr., 448 A.2d 237 (1982); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Clark, Del. Super., 369 A.2d 1084 (1975). If the Act were to apply to the Courts, or any arm of the courts,