Marlene Lichtenstadter
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"imprisonment for life." A copy of the Sentencing Order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress or the States from enacting any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. In other words, the ex post facto prohibition dictates that the statutory penalty in effect at the date of a criminal offense must be the basis for any sentence imposed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981); DiStefano v. Watson, Del. Supr., 566 A.2d 1 (1989).

Thus, as applied to Mr. Reynold's case, the statute defining the penalty for first degree murder in effect on November 29, 1974 governs Mr. Reynolds' sentence. In November, 1974, 11 Del. C.§ 204(1) defined the penalty for first degree murder. In brief, a conviction of first degree murder required imposition of a death sentence unless the death penalty was determined to be unconstitutional. If the death penalty was determined to be unconstitutional, the penalty was "life imprisonment without benefit of parole." a copy of 11 Del. C.§ 4209 in effect in November, 1974 is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

In 1976, the Delaware Supreme Court declared the mandatory death penalty provision of 11 Del. C.§ 4209(a) to be unconstitutional. State v. Spence, Del. Supr., 367 A.2d 983 (1976). After declaring the mandatory death penalty provision