It is an accepted principle of law that language in a statute must be accorded its ordinary meaning unless the context dictates otherwise. Moore v. Chrysler Corporation, Del. Supr., 233 A.2d 53 (1967). In other words, where the language of a statute is plain and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the courts will give to "the statute the exact meaning conveyed by the language, adding nothing thereto, and taking nothing therefrom." Chrysler Corporation v. State, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 345 (1983).
The rules of statutory construction provide that all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part and all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible. Rodney Square Investors v. Bd. of Assess., Del. Super., 448 A.2d 237 (1982). In addition, in constructing a statute a court's objective is to render a "sensible and practical meaning, not an absurd or unreasonable result." Id. at 237.
29 Del. C. § 5905(c)(4) provides that State Police Officers only qualify for compensation for unused sick leave upon retirement or death as further provided for in the statute, namely § 5905(c). Thus, subsection (4), when read together with subsections (2) and (3), establish the only two conditions for compensation of unused sick leave: (1) death of the employee, 29 Del. C. § 5905(c)(2); or (2) "upon retirement under the State Pension Law." 29 Del. C. § 5905(c)(3).
With the above statutory construction principles in mind, we conclude that the intent of the statute was to limit the entitlement to compensation for unused sick leave for retired State Police Officers to either retirement under the State Employees Pension Plan or death. Since a retired State Police Officer is not entitled to a State Employees Pension, such officer, therefore, would not be entitled to compensation for unused sick leave pursuant to § 5905(c)(3). Thus, the only condition where such an officer would be entitled to compensation would be upon his or her death pursuant to § 5905(c)(4).